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Highlights
Recent events in some Member States show that the EU’s values 
(article 2, TEU), in particular the Rule of Law, are not exempt 
from being challenged. Constitutional changes in Hungary, 
executive non-compliance with constitutional court rulings in 
Romania, and expulsion of Bulgarian and Hungarian Roma 
citizens in France are some of the episodes that illustrate these 
challenges.
Article 7 provides a mechanism for securing Member States´ 
compliance with the values contained in article 2. However, its 
potential devastating effects makes it unsuitable for an early 
reaction to potential threats. Hence, the EU needs to equip itself 
with a better procedure for scrutinising Member States’ compliance 
with the Rule of Law for which the EU Commission and the 
European Council have proposed alternative instruments. Rather 
than adding a new proposal, a number of principles outlined in 
the recommendations should inspire this new mechanism.
1 Professor Carlos Closa <carlos.closa@eui.eu> is Co-Director of the Global 
Governance Programme research area “European, Transnational and Global 
Governance” at the of the European University Institute.
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Background
Constitutional and legal changes in Hungary 
triggered concerns regarding the EU’s ability 
to enforce Member States’ compliance with 
the Rule of Law principles contained in article 
2 of the Lisbon Treaty (TEU). Both the Venice 
Commission and the European Parliament 
(EP) extensively documented how these 
changes contradicted European common 
standards and some scholars have considered 
them “constitutional capture” or “backsliding” 
of constitutional essence. Events in Romania 
(involving the governmental defiance of a 
constitutional court ruling) and France (whose 
government expelled Bulgarian and Romanian 
Roma citizens) contributed to increased 
concerns about the availability and effectiveness 
of EU instruments in dealing with challenges to 
the Rule of Law. These concerns are by no means 
new. In the past, the accession to government 
of Haider’s far-right party in Austria led to the 
adoption of bilateral sanctions, even though no 
specific act (beyond Haider’s programme and 
declarations) could be identified as being against 
EU values. 
The EU has applied different instruments in 
each of these situations. In the Romanian case, 
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
agreed with both Bulgaria and Romania as part 
of their accession treaties provides a lawful way 
for the European Commission (EC) to monitor 
the situation and give it leverage for obtaining 
compliance. In the French case, bilateral 
dialogue between the EC and the French 
government halted the expulsion of the Roma 
population which had started. In the Hungarian 
case however, the combination of infringement 
cases brought to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), coupled with  political pressure, has not 
succeeded in redressing the effects of the changes, 
and attempts at backsliding have not receded. 
In the summer of 2014, Orbán proclaimed 
his intention of turning the country into an 
“illiberal” democracy based on the models of 
Russia and China, arguing that he did not think 
that “European Union membership precludes 
building an illiberal state based on national 
foundations”. In spring 2015, Orbán launched 
a very controversial national consultation 
on migration. He also supported a renewed 
discussion on the re-introduction of the death 
penalty. On 30 April 2015, European Parliament 
leaders decided to discuss this and requested the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE) to consider the issue.
The EU has not activated the instrument 
specifically designed to deal with breaches of 
this kind, that is, article 7 TEU, which introduces 
three stages of a procedure that ranges from 
noticing to sanctioning Member States for 
breaching the values sanctioned in article 2 TEU 
(respect for human dignity, freedom, equality, the 
Rule of Law and respect for human rights). The 
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common perception is that article 7 works as a 
nuclear bomb: its effects could be so devastating 
that no-one is really prepared to pull the trigger. 
This inability to use the “nuclear” option creates 
what Commissioner Reding, among others, 
described as the Copenhagen dilemma (in reality, 
a paradox): whilst the EU has the instruments to 
scrutinise applicants’ compliance with the acquis 
on values listed in article 2, no procedure exists 
to monitor compliance by actual members. 
Box 1: A new EU framework to strengthen the Rule of Law 
The Framework contains three main elements: 
• the definition of the situations which would activate the procedure 
• the identification of the principles inspiring action and 
• the stages of the procedure. 
Situations respond to the notion of “systemic threats” (for which the Commission referred to consolidated 
case-law definitions), excluding individual breaches of fundamental rights or miscarriages of justice. 
However, the notion of “systemic threats” remains undefined and this has activated calls for further 
clarification.  
Principles. The Commission identified the following four principles: finding a solution through dialogue 
with the concerned Member State; ensuring an objective and thorough assessment of the situation; respecting 
the principle of equal treatment and indicating swift and concrete actions. Among these, equality is the 
key principle, given the persisting suspicions and allegations of a discriminatory attitude towards states 
becoming EU members after 2004.
Stages. The Commission designed a three-stage process: assessment, recommendation and follow-up.
In the assessment stage, the Commission would gather information and would initiate a political dialogue 
with the concerned state. Exchanges and dialogue would remain confidential (with the expectation that 
the duty of sincere cooperation will prevent any further and/or irreversible measure by the member 
state). On the downside, confidentiality reduces coercion since it impedes naming and shaming.
 
If the first stage does not produce the sought results, the Commission would activate the second: a “Rule 
of Law” recommendation which would identify the source of concerns and recommend the Member State 
to address them. The Commission may also recommend specific measures to be taken. Commissioner 
Reding explicitly argued that article 7 TEU could be interpreted using the model of the infringement 
procedure (article 258 TFEU). 
Finally, the follow-up stage leads to the possibility of activating one of the mechanisms of article 7 TEU, 
although this did not result in any way automatically from previous stages. 
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2 Council of the European Union Opinion of the Legal Service  Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen 
the Rule of Law: compatibility with the Treaties Doc 10296/14 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10296-2014-INIT/
en/pdf 
3 See an additional criticism of the Council Legal Service Opinion in Dimitry Kochenov et Laurent Pech Renforcer le respect de l’État 
de droit dans l’UE : Regards critiques sur les nouveaux mécanismes proposés par la Commission et le Conseil Question d’Europe n°356 
11 mai 2015 http://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-356-fr.pdf
4 UK Government Review of the balance of Competences between the UK and the EU-EU enlargement (December 2014). Para 2.116: 
The Government does not accept the need for a new EU rule of law framework applying to all Member States. There are already mecha-
nisms in place to protect EU common values and a further EU mechanism would risk undermining the clear roles for the Council and 
the European Council in the area.
5 See UK House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee Documents considered by the Committee on 7 May 2014 - Commission 
Communication: A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/
cmeuleg/83-xliii/8304.htm 
The Commission Framework on the
Rule of Law
Against this background, both the EP and 
national governments have claimed the need for 
alternative/additional solutions, and  in February 
2014 the EC established A new EU framework 
to strengthen the Rule of Law (see box 1). The 
Commission cautiously presented it as a residual 
instrument to be activated only in cases of 
“systemic threats” to the Rule of Law in Member 
States. The Framework will only operate when 
national mechanisms cease to operate effectively. 
It does not substitute any existing instruments; 
rather, it complements procedures envisaged in 
article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union  (TFEU) (infringement) 
and article 7 TEU. Despite responding to EP 
and governmental demands, the Framework 
attracted criticism. Thus, the Council’s Legal 
Service issued an Opinion arguing that the 
absence of solid and unambiguous competence 
by the Commission made its proposed procedure 
incompatible with the principle of conferral2. The 
Legal Service did not question the Commission´s 
competence ratione materiae, but denied that the 
legal basis for the procedures developed in the 
new Framework existed3.   
For the Council’s Legal Service, there is no legal 
basis (…) to create a new supervision mechanism 
of the respect of the Rule of Law by the Member 
States, additional to what is laid down in Article 
7 TEU, neither to amend, modify or supplement 
the procedure laid down in this Article. Were the 
Council to act along such lines, it would run the risk 
of being found to have abased its powers by deciding 
without a legal basis. But the Legal Service did not 
explicitly question the heart of the matter, i.e. the 
“assessment stage”, which involved precisely such 
interaction, meaning the insertion of a political 
dialogue between the Commission and the state 
in question (beyond the fact that article 7 TEU 
does not explicitly entitle  the Commission to 
make a recommendation). As for the argument 
that the Framework amends, supplements or 
modifies article 7 TEU, it seems clear that the 
proposal may be taken as a supplement but with 
little legal implications: it leads only to the first 
stage of article 7 (i.e. Commission initiative). 
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Hence, it does not change the procedure. 
Moreover, as the Roma case in France proves, 
discrete dialogue between the Commission and 
individual Member States may well take place 
and provide for solutions, in the absence of a 
clear and explicit procedure.
The British government also criticised the 
Framework, lamenting the duplication of already 
existing institutions and procedures to deal with 
the issue, and the undermining of the role of 
Member States in the Council as a consequence 
of the enhanced role of the Commission4.  The 
House of Commons endorsed and amplified this 
critique and added its own concerns regarding 
the uncertainty about what, precisely, would 
activate the Framework5.  
In reality, the Framework does not duplicate 
existing institutions or procedures. It adds a 
preparatory stage for the Commission in relation 
to its own position under article 7. Similarly, 
the “enhanced” role of the Commission would 
hardly affect Member States’ position. In fact, 
political pressures from large Member States 
have deeply limited the role of the Commission 
in other infringement procedures (i.e. Excessive 
Deficit Procedure). The criticism concerning 
uncertainty, however, is fair: the values in article 
2 are highly unspecified and they face systematic 
problems of definition. The same applies to 
the notion of “systemic breach”, which the 
Commission struggled to define. Having said 
that, the criticism not only affects the Framework, 
but article 7 itself, which establishes such highly 
unspecified provisions (for example, the highly 
vague notion of clear risk of a serious breach in 
art. 7.1).
The Alternative European Council 
Mechanism
Against this background, the European Council 
approved a different mechanism in December 
2014. The December summit conclusions outlined 
a mechanism, its principles, its limitations and 
some procedural aspects, all of them highly 
unspecific both in terms of their meaning and 
reach, as well as their legal implications. The 
new mechanism is simply a “dialogue among all 
Member States” and is aimed at promoting and 
protecting the Rule of Law. What such dialogue 
should be remains very vague and undefined: 
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The Council may propose debating “thematic 
subject matters”. 
The European Council set three limitations for this 
dialogue: the principle of conferred competences, 
respect for national identities of Member States 
and their essential state functions, and adherence 
to the principle of sincere cooperation. The 
excessive guarding principles behind this 
mechanism can be seen through the literal 
interpretation of the first limitation: Respecting 
the principle of conferred competences may lead 
to the somehow ridiculous conclusion that no 
dialogue may take place between Ministers of 
Member States regarding competences that are 
not conferred to the EU!
The European Council identified the principles 
upon which the debate should be based: 
objectivity, non-discrimination and equal 
treatment of all Member States. The Dialogue 
should proceed as a non-partisan and evidence-
based approach. Whilst the latter principle refers 
to some kind of fact-finding, the EC has avoided 
mentioning the different alternatives discussed 
(such as the Copenhagen Commission, the 
Venice Commission, etc.). The EC has preferred 
to refer to the principle of complementarity as an 
indirect mechanism for gathering facts: dialogue 
will be developed in a way which is complementary 
with other EU Institutions and International 
Organisations, avoiding duplication and taking 
into account existing instruments and expertise in 
this area.
The European Council mechanism raises a 
significant number of criticisms. It is based 
on the lowest possible level of formalisation: 
disregarding even some of the soft-law 
instruments available, such as Decisions or 
Declarations, the new instrument merely 
emanates from one of the points in the 
“conclusions”. It is also entirely undefined and 
avoids targeting breaches. Moreover, obligation 
to implement it is next to none: Member States 
“commit” themselves to merely establishing the 
mechanism. In addition, the new procedure 
marks a total shift towards an intergovernmental 
approach to resolving issues: the General Affairs 
Council of Ministers will meet once a year to 
discuss the themes, and its preparation is 
entrusted to the COREPER and the Presidency 
of the Council. No role is envisaged for the EP, 
nor the Commission, or for any other EU body. 
Hence, no external control on governments exists 
a priori. Finally, the potential consequences of 
the dialogue seem to be inexistent (although a 
pious interpretation may argue that the Council 
may go for bold decisions). The new dialogue is 
in fact deprived of any coercion power, even in 
its softer form: the procedure does not mention 
peer review (or, indeed, any kind of review!). 
Furthermore, there is no explicit obligation 
of making public the dialogue itself or its 
conclusions thus avoiding public scrutiny and 
even the soft coercion mechanisms associated 
with naming and shaming.
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Policy Recommendations
The events of the past years show that the EU 
cannot disregard any future challenge to the 
Rule of Law in Member States. So far, available 
instruments have not proven their worth to deal 
with these issues. On the one hand, activation 
of article 7 presents severe difficulties due to 
its nuclear character. On the other hand, the 
European Council has settled for a harmless 
instrument whose inefficacy is predictable. Within 
this context, the Commission Framework, despite 
its limitations, remains a better instrument. The 
below recommendations should be taken into 
account either in the implementation of existing 
instruments or in the design of new ones.
1. Rather than defining the Rule of Law in 
formal substantive terms, its compliance should 
be assessed in relation to common or shared 
standards. One way could be referring to the 
set of indicators and criteria specified in already 
existing documents (such as those of the Venice 
Commission and EU Commission). The same 
applies to “systemic threats” which are nowhere 
defined, despite existing agreements on the 
kind of situations that will trigger action. The 
Assessment of compliance to the Rule of Law 
should be done by comparing best practices.
2. The existence of different procedures 
dealing with Rule of Law compliance may 
convey a perception of inequality as regards the 
treatment of different Member States. A single 
procedure translates better the principle of equal 
treatment.
3. A regular monitoring mechanism of the 
compliance of Member States with the Rule of 
Law should be put into practice. An ‘incidental’ 
review (i.e. one activated by specific events and/
or demanded by some parties) leaves too large a 
margin of appreciation as to whether or not to 
activate the mechanism.
4. The EU should take advantage of the 
expertise of the Venice Commission to respond 
to the request for independent expertise, so as 
to avoid duplication and ensure a consolidated 
know-how.
5. A fair hearing principle should be 
established to guarantee fair treatment for 
offending states, meaning (as proposed by the 
Austrian government) that “any Member State 
[under scrutiny] must be given the possibility 
to explain its position to all the other Member 
States at all stages in the procedure.”
6. The ECJ should be given the power of 
judicial review of the decision determining 
that there is a serious and persistent breach of 
common values or a clear risk of such a breach.
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